Topics and Notes Summary

For our third EELE 487 reading response on D2L, we will consider the IEEE Code of Ethics (see page 157-158 of the text), and also the IEEE Code of Conduct.

Address the following question statement, using SPECIFIC examples and themes from the readings and other sources.  The response is to be 350-500 words:  not too short but also not too long.  Be careful to focus on your key claims:  do not simply list your opinions, but back up what you claim with facts and evidence.

A Code of Ethics is one means for a professional organization (such as IEEE) to inform and remind its members about ethical principles and practices.

The IEEE Code of Ethics and the related Code of Conduct express the group's collective sense of what attributes constitute ethical action and responsibility by engineers.  The Codes cannot express every single possible ethical problem, but they are intended to be a framework for discussion and consideration of ethical concepts by practicing engineers.

But what about engineering students?  For this reading response, please consider the IEEE Codes and discuss whether or not these ideas are meaningful for engineering students taking college courses and working on academic projects.  Specifically, describe how the Codes might apply to engineering students, or what additional code elements should be added to express the needs of university student engineers.

All reading responses are due by 5:00PM on Saturday, March 28, 2015.  Remember, no late work is accepted.

Between 5PM on Saturday and class time on Tuesday, March 31, please read as many of your classmates' responses as possible.  Be ready to discuss the topics during class on Tuesday.

For our second EELE 487 reading response on D2L, we will consider the use of mobile phone technology when driving a car.

Address the following question statement, using SPECIFIC examples and themes from the readings and other sources.  The response is to be 350-500 words:  not too short but also not too long.  Be careful to focus on your key claims:  do not simply list your opinions, but back up what you claim with facts and evidence.

Many jurisdictions have instituted laws that restrict the use of cell phones and other handheld communications devices when driving a car.  Whether or not you personally agree or disagree with these rules, the law makes it clear that you can be fined for texting or talking with a handheld device.

Modern smart phones are equipped with accelerometers and GPS technology that could, in theory, cause a phone moving more than a specified speed to disable automatically its texting and calling features (except for 911 calls, perhaps).  Other than the obvious problem of distinguishing between a passenger who can legally be texting vs. the driver who cannot, from your standpoint as an engineer, what do you consider the moral and ethical principles of designing technology that "outsmarts" the user by deactivating itself in this manner?  Are there sufficient reasons that the decision to text or not text should be left to the driver, or are there sufficient public safety reasons that calling and texting should be restricted by design to when the phone is not moving?

All reading responses are due by 5:00PM on Saturday, February 28, 2015.  Remember, no late work is accepted.

Between 5PM on Saturday and class time on Tuesday, March 3, please read as many of your classmates' responses as possible.  Be ready to discuss the topics during class on Tuesday.

For our initial EELE 487 reading response on D2L, we will consider an aspect of the Challenger space shuttle accident.

Address the following question statement, using SPECIFIC examples and themes from the readings.  The response is to be 350-500 words:  not too short but also not too long.  Be careful to focus on your key claims and views.

Prior to the Challenger accident in January, 1986, the Thiokol engineers had observed O-ring erosion on several earlier shuttle flights dating back to the start of the program in 1980-81.  They felt they had evidence and theoretical rationale that the problem was likely to be worse in cold weather, hence their recommendation that Challenger not be launched until the temperature was at least 53F. 

However, the NASA solid rocket project managers, particularly Larry Mulloy, insisted that without more direct evidence of cold weather issues, Thiokol was overly cautious and needed to go ahead and sign the launch authorization.  Ultimately the senior Thiokol management did sign the authorization over the objections of the engineers. 

Following the accident the investigation revealed internal engineering memos among the Thiokol engineers and managers discussing the O-ring erosion that had been observed, but the NASA managers claimed that they had not been made aware of the seriousness of these observations, and that Thiokol must have downplayed the problem because they were worried about losing NASA contracts.  The Thiokol engineers, on the other hand, said that NASA was so eager to keep the shuttle program on schedule that they basically ignored the warning signs.

What, if anything, can we learn from this finger-pointing?  Specifically, what mechanism can you conceive that would avoid the conflicts of interest that crept into the Challenger launch decision process?

All reading responses are due by 5:00PM on Saturday, February 7, 2015.  Remember, no late work is accepted.

Between 5PM on Saturday and class time on Tuesday, February 10, please read as many of your classmates' responses as possible.  Be ready to discuss the topics during class on Tuesday.